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NOTICE
Every Move You Make: How Stories Shape the
Law of Stalking
Anna-Rose Mathieson
EVERY BREATH You TAKE: STALKING NARRATIVES AND THE LAW.

By Orit Kamir. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 2001.
Pp. ix, 245. $50.

INTRODUCTION

"Bunny-boiler" is now an official part of the English language.1
This word - taken from the scene in Fatal Attraction2 where Glenn
Close's character boils the pet rabbit of the man she has been stalking3
- was unknown fifteen years ago. Although still not in common
parlance, "bunny-boiler" has made its way far enough into our culture
that a brief explanation of its source can conjure up an image of the
obsessive, vindictive stalker it describes.4 Along with the entrance of
this word into our language has come an explosive growth in laws
punishing stalkers. Before 1990, no state in the nation had an anti
stalking law. Now every state does.5
1. Or, at least, it was just added to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. See Blairite
BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 2002, at http://news.bbc.eo.uk/1/hi/uk/
2282572.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
and Jedi Enter Dictionary,

2. FATAL ATTRACTION (Paramount Pictures 1987).
3. The word "stalking," when used to describe this type of conduct, is itself a recent
addition to our language. Until the late 1970s, references to "stalking" were generally lim
ited to the wholesome sports of deerhunting and boxing, activities that Kamir suggests are
characteristic of American manhood. P. 146. In the media flurry over the serial killer known
as Son of Sam, however, the press seized on the term "stalking" to describe the killer's mo
dus operandi, and soon "stalking" became a common description of the obsessive activities
of serial killers and rapists. Pp. 146-48. And now "stalking" is pervasive - as one commenta
tor put it, stalking is the "crime of the nineties." Gregor Krause, Stalking: The Crime of the
Nineties, ALBUQUERQUE MAG., Jan. 1993, at 26.
4. A Google search of "bunny-boiler" turned up 1,370 hits as of March 2, 2003, includ
ing sites where disgruntled girlfriends could request a Glenn Close-type to stalk their
boyfriends via cell phone (http://www.rabbit-on.com/girlfriend_boil.php); the "Bunny-Boiler
Bordello" of paintings by a manic-depressive (http://www.timoldham.co.uk); and lyrics to
the song Bunny Boiler by an obscure German rock band (http://www.purelyrics.com/index.
php?lyrics=ibxcicmy).
5. The federal government does as well, although there is some concern over whether
this is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. The federal anti-stalking
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In Every Breath You Take: Stalking Narratives and the Law,6
Orit Kamir7 traces the development of stalking narratives through
Sumerian mythology, British literature, and modern cinema, showing
how Glenn Close's bunny-boiling character is merely the latest incar
nation of an ancient archetype.8 Kamir argues that these stories of
stalking influence societal attitudes even though we may not be
conscious of the stories themselves (p. 3). Through this historical and
literary exploration Kamir answers by illustration one of her central
questions: "(W)hat, in the broad, cultural sense, is stalking?" (p. 1).
Yet the legal implications of this inquiry are not immediately
apparent. The bulk of the book - 174 out of 215 pages - is devoted
to literary analysis of stalking narratives, with a short discussion of law
at the end. Kamir's critique is insightful and entertaining, but what
exactly does the law have to learn from an analysis of Fatal Attraction?
The answer is twofold.9 First, although there have been scores of
law review articles describing, analyzing, and criticizing the legal sys
tem's approach to stalking, Kamir's account is unique in the way her
detailed examination of stalking narratives explains the unconscious
preconceptions that make us describe, analyze, and criticize stalking
law the way we do. Second, stalking narratives fuel the fear of stalking
that leads society to criminalize it, and even affect the definition of the
crime itself. Since the legal definition of stalking uses the "reasonable
person test" - assessing the fears and reactions of a typical person to
determine whether actions constitute criminal stalking - stalking sto
ries affect the scope of stalking statutes by shaping the subconscious
fears of the "average" member of the community.

law is a component of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), which was partially
struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating component of
Act that created a federal civil remedy). The circuit courts that have examined VAWA's
anti-stalking provision so far have concluded it is constitutional. See, e.g., United States v.
Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2002).
6. The title presumably comes from the Police song, which croons "Every breath you
take/Every move you make/Every bond you break/Every step you take/I'll be watching
you." POLICE, Every Breath You Take, on SYNCHRONICITY (A&M Records 1983). This ap
pears to be a popular title for stalking literature. See, e.g., ANN RULE, EVERY BREATH You
TAKE: A TRUE STORY OF OBSESSION, REVENGE, AND MURDER (2001 ) .
7. Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Visiting Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School, Winter 2004.
8. Kamir uses "archetype" not in its Jungian sense as an image embedded in the human
psyche, but instead as a metaphor for "culturally created images." P. 19 n.l.
9. In both of these points, Kamir's intellectual debt to University of Michigan Law
School Professor James Boyd White is evident. Professor White, who served as one of
Kamir's dissertation advisors, pioneered the field of law and literature with the publication
of The Legal Imagination in 1973. See also, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS
TRANSLATION (1990). This might, perhaps, be a good point to mention my own great debt
to Professor White, one of my mentors throughout law school and advisor for the project
that formed the nucleus of this Book Notice.
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This Notice explains how Kamir's eloquent examination of stalking
narratives provides numerous lessons for scholars willing to actively
search out the legal implications. Part I gives an overview of the book,
focusing on Kamir's analysis of archetypical male and female stalkers,
and on the recent wave of stalking laws enacted throughout the
nation. Part II scrutinizes the relationship between stalking and fear,
analyzing the ways in which stalking narratives create and shape the
fear that defines the behavior that society punishes as criminal
stalking. Part III turns to Kamir's central legal argument - a critique
of the reasonable person standard in stalking law - and explains how
her attack on this standard is more broadly applicable than she sug
gests. Finally, Part IV examines Kamir's suggestion for avoiding the
problems caused by the reasonable person standard, and argues that
her solution - entrusting the legislature to define the underlying
value judgments of stalking law - is attractive in theory but flawed in
practice. Given the societal conflicts Kamir describes in the first half
of her book, a jury's case-specific inquiry is better than sweeping
legislative judgments.
I.

WITCHES & VA MPIRES

Kamir divides stalking narratives by the gender of the stalker,10
and spends two chapters for each gender showing how stalking narra
tives evolved through different eras and cultures.11 Throughout all,
Kamir employs the language and vocabulary of feminism. Describing
the horror flick Halloween, for instance, she explains how "[t]he
stalker, no longer mama's castrated boy, is now evil incarnate, over
powered by a stronger woman of his own generation" and sums up the
plot by saying "the pure virgin-mother Laurie battles the bloodthirsty
vampire, survives his attacks, and liberates her community" (pp. 159;
157). In another instance she attempts to translate the arguments of
Jean-Paul Sartre into feminist terms, explaining that Sartre can be in
terpreted as arguing that "the 'vulvaless' imageless male God cannot
give birth to humans, nor create unity and intimacy; he, therefore,
creates abstractly, using language" (pp. 81-82). With this feminist
10. There is a fundamental difference between narratives involving male and female
stalkers. P.3; compare chapters 2, and 3 (discussing female stalkers), with chapters 4, and 5
(male stalkers). Dividing stalking by the gender of the perpetrator roughly divides it by the
gender of the victim as well, since most stalkers - both male and female, real and fictional
- stalk the opposite sex. Not all, however, do. See, e.g., ANNE RICE, INTERVIEW WITH THE
VAMPIRE (1976).
11. She punctuates this analysis with six short appendices that are tangentially but
intriguingly related to her main discussion. One appendix, for instance, reprints the first
chapter of Varney the Vampire, a sensational serial from 1840s England. Pp. 109-11; see also
pp. 98-99 for Kamir's analysis of the lessons to be learned from Varney. Other appendices
include "On the (Un)Approachability of Antiquity," App. 2.1, and "The Literary Summer of
1816: Lamb, Shelly, Byron, and Polidori," App 5.1.
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analysis she reveals how the types of stories told about stalkers depend
upon which gender is cast as the aggressor.
The quintessential female stalker is the mythological character of
Lilit - a "dark, long-haired, night-flying she-devil" (p. 19). The
stalking she-devil first appears in ancient Mesopotamian myths; Kamir
argu¥S that this frightening character was created by patriarchal rulers
in an attempt to subvert earlier stories of powerful female goddesses.12
To control the earlier and more benevolent images of women, the
patriarchy invented stories that cast powerful women as evil witches,
baby-snatchers, sorceresses, and succubae (pp. 30-32). In these new
stories, "[f]emale stalking is felt as repetitively returning, sexual,
seducing, terrifying, and guilt inducing" (pp. 4-5).
Male stalkers appear in a wider and more popular variety of narra
tives than female stalkers; the range spans from Doctor Faust to "the
biblical God's watchful, ever-present, and unseen eye" (p. 68). The
vampire is the archetypical male stalker, and also "our culture's most
popular and interesting stalker."13 In these stories, "male stalking of a
woman objectifies her, posing her as 'matter' for her stalker's
subjecting, controlling gaze. It undermines her subjectivity, dehuman
izing and humiliating her" (p. 208). Stories involving male stalkers are
also used as tools of control by the patriarchal social order, but in a
different way than stories of female stalkers. While the latter stories
serve as a cohesive force for men by suggesting that female power and
sexuality are inextricably linked to evil (p. 42), stories of male stalkers
enforce societal norms by punishing those who stray from the main
stream (p. 68).
In general, archetypes of both male and female stalkers peacefully
coexist in society's collective unconscious.14 From time to time, how
ever, fear of these figures erupts in waves of panic. In these periods of
panic, the population becomes obsessed with a "phenomenon that is
irrationally perceived as exceptionally dangerous to the collective
well-being" (pp. 5; 51-67). Witch-hunts, for instance, erupt when fear
of female stalkers comes to a boil. Harmless personal characteristics,
like owning a black cat or having a warty nose, can take on a sinister
aspect when they fit the image of an evil character described in stories.
12. P. 30; see also pp. 19-32. Kamir explains in great detail how "the Great Goddess of
antiquity was conquered and replaced by patriarchy's omnipotent male God." P. 20.
13. P. 77. Movies involving male stalkers include BRAM STOKER'S DRACULA
(Columbia Pictures 1992) and SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures 1991). But see FATAL
ATTRACTION (Paramount Pictures 1987). Male stalkers are even good material for a theme
park. See Perhaps No Home Soil for Dracula, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at AS (describing
how conservationists have blocked plans to build a Dracula theme park, complete with
amusement rides, a golf course, and a spooky Gothic castle, in the hometown of Vlad
the Impaler (the model for Dracula); the developers now plan to build the park outside
Bucharest).
14. For Jung's explanation of the collective unconscious, see CARL GUSTAV JUNG, 9
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. JUNG (R.F. Hull & Michael Fordham eds., 1980).
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Kamir argues that our society·is currently in the midst of one of
these moral panics (pp. 140-74). The current wave of alarm first
became visible in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as there was a verita
ble cultural renaissance of stalking stories.15 Along with these stories,
well-publicized incidents of real stalkers16 fueled societal fear (p. 141).
This fear spurred passage of anti-stalking laws in every state, yet these
laws "served only to amplify" societal panic (p. 175).
After describing this panic, Kamir argues that our fear of stalking
is overblown in proportion to the actual threat (pp. 194-98). Kamir
slightly overstates some of her arguments about the current moral
panic to prove this point; while our society may be more concerned
about stalking now than fifty years ago, it is nothing like the full-blown
panic of the Salem witch trials,17 or, for that matter, the vampire hunts
that are currently causing panic in Malawi.18 Mini-panics may follow
publicity over real cases of stalking, but there is not a sustained,
overwhelming obsession with stalking.
Kamir argues that in our frenzy to deal with the perceived threat of
stalkers, we have passed anti-stalking laws that are underinclusive of
the actual threat (pp. 181-86). The California anti-stalking statute, for
instance - the first one in the nation and a model for later statutes punishes "[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or
great bodily injury."19 Under this definition, Ted Bundy, Son of Sam,
and Dracula - men whom Kamir .suggests fit the classic image of a
stalker - would not be deemed guilty of criminal stalking. None of
these classic stalkers "harassed" their victims before the crimes, since
"harassment" within the meaning of the statute requires a course of
conduct over some extended period of time (p. 182). Indeed, even the
real-life "stalker" who is generally considered the catalyst for modern
ariti-stalking legislation would not be guilty under this definition.20

15. Such as Robert DeNiro's character in Taxi
156-60, and Fatal Attraction, pp. 171-74.

Driver,

pp. 141-43, and the films

Halloween, pp.

16. Particularly Son of Sam, pp. 143•48, and Ted Bundy, pp. 148-49.
17. See generally FRANCES HILL, A DELUSION OF SATAN: THE FULL STORY OF THE
SALEM WITCH TRIALS (1995); MARION L. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETTS: A
MODERN ENQUIRY INTO THE SALEM WITCH TRIALS (1969).
18. See Rachel L. Swarns, Not Your Usual Vampires, but Scary Nonetheless, N.Y. TIMES.
Jan. 14, 2003, at A4 (describing how Malawi "is in the grip of a form of hysteria" over men in
black clothing who strike at night, drugging their victims and draining their blood), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/0l/14/international/africa/14VAMP.html.
19. P. 182; C AL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (2003). The punishment is a maximum of one
year and/or a fine of $1,000.
20. Pp. 182-83. This man is Robert Bardo, who stalked and killed actress Rebecca
Schaeffer in California. Pp. 175-79.
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It is certainly true that current stalking laws are not precisely tai
lored to capture all stalking behavior. Some of the underinclusiveness
that Kamir laments, however, is directly related to the way the earlier
part of the book answered the question of "[W]hat, in the broad,
cultural sense, is stalking?" (p. 1). The crime of stalking may be
underinclusive of what we describe as stalking because the word
"stalking" is itself overinclusive of what we believe should be punished
as criminal. The fact that stalking laws do not punish everyone whom
Kamir has labeled as a "stalker" does not in itself prove that the
legislature negligently drafted underinclusive laws; it could instead be
a legislative judgment that some "stalkers" are better dealt with under
existing murder and assault statutes.21
It is also unclear if the legislative response is as haphazard and in
coherent as Kamir portrays. The initial wave of statutes were, of
course, hastily passed - all fifty states and the federal government
passed anti-stalking laws within a three-year period (p. 1). Kamir is
quite right that this rush may have "rendered [the statutes] incapable
of properly addressing many types of stalking, including those very
types [they] supposedly set out to address" (pp. 181-82). But while the
initial stalking laws may have been passed in a frantic flurry, most
states have been revising these laws as the flaws that Kamir points out
become more obvious.2 2 Kamir primarily focuses on the California
anti-stalking statute - which happens to be one that has not been
substantially revised since its passage - and spends only a single
paragraph describing the statutes of other states (pp. 184-85). Because
of this focus on California, Kamir glosses over the conscientious
attempts made by many other states to fine-tune their statutes.
II. CREATING FEAR, CREATING CRIME
The legal definition of stalking criminalizes a pattern of conduct,
not a single act. Considered separately, many of the individual acts
that together constitute stalking are subject to punishment already.23 A
21. Indeed, as Kamir explains elsewhere, the majority of law review articles responded
to the initial wave of underinclusive statutes by arguing that the laws were unconstitutionally
vague and that the crime should "be redefined so that the law would capture even fewer
types of stalking." P. 185. At least one court has agreed, see Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski,
637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994), while others have found the state statutes constitutional, see
Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Stalking Statutes,
29 A.LR.5th 487 ( 1995 & Supp. 2003) (collecting cases).
22. See, e.g., J. Thomas
Efforts to Stop Stalkers, 85

Kirkman, Every Breath You Take: Massachusetts Steps up Its
MASS. L. REV. 174, 176 (describing the gradual evolution of
Massachusetts's anti-stalking laws after a hasty enactment); Development: Criminal Law and
Procedure: Stalking Amendments, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1156, 1156-57 (explaining how Utah's
anti-stalking law was first passed in 1992, and amended in 1994, 1996, and 1999, each time
making it more effective).
23. Harassment, for instance, typically covers making "a telephone call without purpose
of legitimate communication" or "any other course of alarming conduct serving no legit.i-
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stalker who boils the pet bunny of his24 target, for instance, can be
punished for trespass, conversion, and intentional infliction of emo
tional distress. While overcriminalization is certainly rampant in our
legal system,25 however, anti-stalking laws do not merely give prosecu
tors another basic charge to heap upon someone accused of a violent
act. Instead, anti-stalking laws can be used to punish the repetition of
otherwise "innocent" behavior - repeated phone calls; excessive,
obsessive love letters; watching someone from afar.26
What is the harm in the repetition of behavior that transforms
conduct from merely annoying to criminal stalking? Is it just that soci
ety worries that this obsessive behavior is a sign that the stalker will
soon progress to more serious physical harm? This may be some of the
concern, but there is more at stake than the desire to preventatively
incapacitate the stalker before he commits an actual act of violence.27
The legislative record surrounding the passage of state and federal
anti-stalking statutes suggests that we would punish stalking even if we
knew no violent crime would result. Stalking causes fear of what might
happen next, yet we punish it not just to prevent the crime that might
happen, but also for causing the fear itself.
Not many crimes are explicitly linked to fear in this way. Of the
few that are, the correlation is often a side effect. We punish
attempted murder, for instance, because it shows the culprit had a bad
mind and the willingness to act upon it, not just because of the fear it
caused the victim - we would consider the criminal as culpable even
if the intended victim never learned her life was in danger.28 While
assault does punish conduct because of the fear it causes, it is a much
mate purpose." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (2001). Indeed, many of the individual inci
dents could be prosecuted twice or thrice over given the overcriminalization of American
law. Thus, "'[s]talking is a complicated crime to pursue. Because of the level of proof re
quired by many state stalking laws, it's often easier to pursue a different, related crime, such
as assault. . . .' " Janet L. Holt, Interstate Stalking Ban Survives Constitutional Challenge in
Sixth Circuit, TRIAL, July 2002, at 90, 92 (quoting Diane Alexander of the Stalking Resource
Center).
24. Following Kamir's usage, this Notice uses female pronouns to refer to stalking vic
tims and male pronouns for stalkers.
25. See William J. Stuntz,
505 (2001).

The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,

100 MICH. L. REV.

26. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Bradfield, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect
Stalking Victims?, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 234 (1998) ("While individual acts may not
be criminal in isolation, combined they may constitute an illegal pattern of behavior. . ..").
27. Indeed, if this were the true motivation, it would raise several serious due process
issues. Cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In an ironic twist, the need for preven
tative incapacitation can actually be addressed by "stalking" the stalker. Police can use ankle
devices equipped with G.P.S. monitors to track every detail of a convicted stalker's move
ments. See Eric Chabrow, Every Move You Make, Every Breath You Take,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Aug. 30, 2002, at http://www.informationweek.com/story/
IWK20020830S0027 (last visited Oct. 27, 2002).
28. The effect upon the victim may sometimes be considered in sentencing, however,
and often is tacitly included in a jury's determination.
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more concentrated, definable fear than stalking. We can specifically
describe what the victim was afraid of - getting punched in the face
or stabbed with a knife - so this fear can be discussed and evaluated
semi-objectively.29 Although we may never have been punched in the
face, we have at least experienced some analogous type of physical
fright and felt the gut-wrenching sensation of fear.
Stalking is.different. It is hard to define what the victim is afraid of,
and often there are no specific acts of the stalker that we can identify
as the direct cause of fear. This is where Kamir's detailed examination
of legal narrative helps us understand the law, because narratives of
stalking help construct the fear that causes our society to criminalize
stalking.
First, stalking stories shape the way we perceive patterns of
conduct. An obsessed, ex-boyfriend is transformed from someone we
pity into someone we fear because we have read so many newspaper
articles in which these seemingly pathetic figures have snapped. If
innocent actions fit into the patterns we have learned from stalking
narratives, we suspect the actions are not truly innocent. Indeed, it was
the explosion of media stories following an actual incident of stalking
- an obsessed fan stalked and killed actress Rebecca Schaeffer that was the primary catalyst for the first anti-stalking law in the
United States.30 This murderer perfectly fit the archetypal image of a
stalker, so both the population and politicians panicked. It is eerie to
have fact conform to fiction, particularly when the genre is horror.
And in a rush to appear to be doing something to solve the problem,
legislatures tailored the new anti-stalking laws to punish the mythical
stalkers that our culture fears instead of dealing with the reality of
stalking in America (p. 175).
Second, stories of stalking manufacture fear through emotional
manipulation. This process is particularly visible in horror films, for
"the emotional manipulation of film teaches viewers ... to expect that
stalkers, both male and female, might hunt them in real life" (p. 116).
The fictional nature of horror films is obvious, yet who is not a little
uneasy at being alone in a dark house after watching a particularly

29. In assault crimes, the victim can describe the conduct that caused him fear. This is
true for both the crime and tort of assault, which punish conduct that raises a "reasonable
apprehension of imminent battery." See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (2000).
30. Rebecca Schaffer's killer was dubbed by US News & World Reports as " 'the arche
typal stalker.'" P. 177. Kamir presents this as the theory accepted by almost all other schol
ars, but challenges the validity of the explanation herself. Pp. 175-79; see also, e.g., Nancy K.
D. Lemon, Domestic Violence & Stalking: A Comment on the Model Anti-Stalking Code
Proposed by the National Institute of Justice (1994) ("Popular myth has attributed the moti
vation for this statute to be the stalking/homicide of Rebecca Schaeffer. . .. (but] the statute
actually has its roots in domestic violence."), at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/BWJP/stalking.htm
(last visited Apr. 13, 2003). She does agree, however, that the California law was the catalyst
for every other state to enact an anti-stalking law within the next three years. P. 1.
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scary film? By showing how danger can be everywhere - even
fictional danger - stalking narratives train us how and what to fear.
Finally, stalking stories affect the actual experience of the victim. If
you were to discover tomorrow that someone was taking an obsessive
interest in you, you would likely become more attentive to stalking
narratives. Movies that were once entertaining would become real and
frightening as you began to see parallels to your own experience.
Conduct that might otherwise seem innocent would take on a new di
mension when following the traditional patterns of stalking narratives.
Fear would feed your attention to stalking stories, which in turn would
fuel your fear, for "the fear of stalking within our culture is a product
of an ongoing interaction between fears and the stories told about
them" (p. 3). And this fear is a legally cognizable element of the crime
of stalking.31
III.

THE REASONABLE PERSON & THE STALKING V ICTIM

Perhaps the most interesting legal application of Kamir's research
is on the reasonable person test built into most definitions of stalking.
Unlike most other crimes, anti-stalking laws generally apply this stan
dard to the victim's reactions, not the defendant's conduct. The
California statute requires that the stalker's course of conduct "must
be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional dis
tress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the per
son." 32
Kamir argues that this use of the reasonable person standard to
test the rationality of the victim's fear places the victim in the place
usually occupied by the person on trial - it subtly suggests the
victim's guilt by judging her emotional reactions to determine if they
were "reasonable" (pp. 188-89). By requiring the jury to determine
both what the actual victim felt and what a reasonable person would
feel, Kamir argues that the victim's actions are subjected to scrutiny
and judgment in a manner reminiscent of the archetypal male stalker's
piercing gaze.33

31. P . 184. Although Kamir only considers the relationship between stalking and crimi
nal law, filing a civil claim against a stalker is another possibility for victims. See, e.g., Seema
Zeya, Civil Lawsuits and Safety Planning for Stalking Victims, 44 ADVOCATE, June 2001, at
23. Pursuing only civil claims, however, can pose substantial risks of retaliation from the
stalker. See id. (providing warning signs of escalating danger and practical safety tips for
those filing civil claims against stalkers). Permanent injunctions are another possibility, and
several states offer these at no cost to the victim. See, e.g., Development: Criminal Law and
Procedure, supra note 22, at 1158.
32. P. 182 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1998)) (emphasis added).
33. P. 188 (describing the reasonable person standard as "the male stalker par excel
lence of the legal world's stories").
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The "reasonable victim" standard is used more often than Kamir
suggests; her discussion leaves the reader with the impression that it is
only used in cases tinged with gender and racial bias, such as stalking,
sexual harassment, and hostile work environment claims.34 Yet this
standard finds frequent use in torts such as assault and intentional in
fliction of emotional distress. 35 To recover for the tort of assault, for
instance, the victim must prove he felt a "reasonable apprehension" of
unwanted physical touching.36 To be sure, the "reasonable victim"
standard is not always augmented with a subjective requirement that
the victim prove that he felt fear as well. If someone throws a punch at
you and misses, as long as you were aware that the punch was thrown
we allow recovery for assault, even if through foolish bravado you felt
no fear.37 Yet it is unclear why judging the victim's fear in comparison
to the fear a reasonable person would feel is any more intrusive than
judging the victim's other sensations in comparison to a reasonable
person's. And it seems even more intrusive to judge the victim's
actions - which is, in a sense, what we do for the victim of an assault
who reacts with deadly force in self-defense.
Many states make the availability of a self-defense claim turn on
the objective reasonableness of the action.38 The assault victim - who
now finds himself on trial for murder - is explicitly held up in
comparison to the objective reasonableness standard: his actions are
justified only if his fear was reasonable and his reactions proportional
to the force a reasonable person would use. Indeed, if as Kamir argues
the stalking victim is harmed by the mere act of scrutinizing her
actions, a murder defendant who claims he acted in self-defense is hurt
even more; not only does the jury pass on the reasonableness of his
reaction, but that determination is literally the dividing line between
guilt and innocence. The law not only compares his action to the
model of an "ideal average man" - scrutinizing his instincts and
judging him in comparison to a fictional construct - but condemns
him if he does not live up to that fictional standard.
34. Kamir never asserts this directly, but the implication is drawn from her characteriza
tion of this standard as "rare" coupled with her description of the few instances when the
standard is used.
35. See DOBBS, supra note 29, at 33-34. See generally Richard Restak, The Fiction of the
"Reasonable Man", WASH. POST., May 17, 1987, at C3 (criticizing that standard).
36. DOBBS, supra note 29, at § 34 n.7.
37. Id. § 34 & nn.1-2 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 10).
38. The MODEL PENAL CODE ("MPC") does not incorporate a requirement that the
victim's fear be reasonable, just that it be honest. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(c)
(2001). Most states, however, require that the fear be objectively as well as subjectively rea
sonable. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (concluding that the New York
legislature clearly rejected the MPC approach and incorporated an objective test of reason
ableness into the definition of self-defense); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 801-14 (6th ed. 1995).
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Indeed, every use of the reasonable person test as applied to the
defendant takes place before the determination of guilt and serves to
commute innocent activity into culpability or liability. If legal scrutiny
using the reasonable person test is akin to the domineering gaze of a
male stalker - an experience that Kamir argues is harmful in itself is it fair to subject anyone to this ordeal?39 Kamir's critique is broader
than she casts it: her arguments are not limited to stalking, but apply
generally to the use of a reasonable person standard to evaluate crimi
nal and tortious conduct.40
Despite its potential harms, however, the reasonable person stan
dard "allows for an interesting integration, in the real-world setting of
the courtroom, of the legal stalking story with fictional narratives of
stalking" (p. 192). The average person called to serve on a jury in a
stalking case has probably never experienced firsthand the terror of
being stalked. But the jurors probably are intimately familiar with cul
tural narratives of stalking. Kamir points to Fatal Attraction as the im
age that might first come to mind as a juror struggles to understand
what a reasonable person would feel in the victim's situation. Since the
stalking victim in Fatal Attraction (played by Michael Douglas) is a
fairly normal, empathetic, rational person, it is easy for the jury to use
that fictional character as a model for the fictitious legal standard they
are supposed to apply (pp. 192-94). Kamir argues that by asking the
jury to evaluate what an ill-defined "ideal average man" would feel,
the reasonable person standard "invites uncritical import of cultural
images into the legal discourse, thereby potentially allowing moral
panic to penetrate the law" (p. 186).
But how does this differ from any legal judgment that asks jurors
to determine how they would have acted in another's position? Our
societal narratives are a key reference point whenever we are asked to.
determine the appropriate action in an unfamiliar situation. Indeed,
how are we ever to guess how a "reasonable person" would have acted
except through the stories we tell, both fact and fiction, about the ac
tions of others? Consider the self-defense scenario discussed earlier.
Few people have ever been assaulted at gunpoint, but almost all have
seen movies where heroic figures protect themselves and their
families. When asked to evaluate whether a reasonable person would
have perceived a need to use deadly force in self-defense, a juror
39. Does the stalking victim's experience render her more deserving of special treat
ment than the average innocent person? Kamir's analysis suggests the answer is yes: since
she has already been the victim of a stalker, our legal system should be sensitive to these
scars and avoid scrutinizing her in a way that might trigger fears that would not register in a
person who had never been stalked.
40. For reasons such as this, the MPC has generally abandoned use of reasonable person
analysis in favor of evaluating the defendant's subjective mental states. See Kyron Huigens,
Correspondence, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 811,
815-19 (2002)
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might certainly recall these cinematic images. It is not just for stalking
that the reasonable person standard "facilitates the superimposition of
film scenarios and victims onto the performance of the story in courts
of law" (p. 192). Once again, Kamir's analysis can teach us broad
lessons about the effects of narrative on legal standards, but readers
are on their own to discover what those broader implications might be.
IV.

STALKING SOLUTIONS FOR A CONFLICTED SOCIETY

Kamir's exploration of stalking narratives powerfully highlights the
underlying incoherencies of current stalking law. The basic problem is
that our society is deeply conflicted about how to deal with stalking.
While recent passage of anti-stalking laws shows a concerted attempt
"to liberate women from wide-spread, oppressive social norms" that
condone stalking, the "liberation" is not yet complete. The oppressive
patriarchal norms still pervade societal consciousness (p. 191). Since
the reasonable person standard "is 'a mechanism for importing a pre
existing societal consensus into the law,' "41 Kamir argues that it
should not be used when there is no clear societal consensus about the
proper bounds of the behavior (p. 191). She argues that the reasonable
person test should be eliminated from the definition of stalking, and
suggests that instead "[t]he legislature should bear sole authority for
the determination of such fundamental value judgments; it should not
pretend to assume social consensus where it does not exist" (p. 191).
Kamir's critique of the reasonable person standard is valid and
powerful, and she argues quite convincingly that the ideal solution
would be to abandon this standard entirely and adopt rules focusing
on the defendant's specific intent, course of conduct, and mens rea (p.
212). Yet it is unclear why legislatures stand in a good position to fix
the problem through firmer control of the underlying value judgments.
The anti-stalking laws actually enacted show that legislators are also
deeply conflicted about stalking, arguably more conflicted than society
at large (pp. 181-86). Indeed, right after Kamir suggests that legisla
tures take sole control of the value judgments needed for coherent
stalking laws, she points out that legislators are confused by stalking
and suspicious about making it a serious crime (pp. 191-92). In draft
ing stalking statutes, legislators evidence "a fear of hysterical, hyper
sensitive women" and do not always take the harm from stalking seriously (p. 191).
To overcome these biases, Kamir urges legislatures to deeply
engage in a critical study of stalking narratives, for this would be
"enlightening and helpful in understanding the subtleties of the effects
stalking may have on targeted victims; it may shed light on the
·

41. P. 191 (quoting Nancy S. Ehrenreich,

Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The

Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law,

99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990)).
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damage, anxiety, and anguish they may suffer" (pp. 204-05). A deep
study of stalking narratives would undoubtedly improve legislatures'
ability to craft a comprehensive stalking law - by the end of this
book, Kamir has certainly convinced the reader of at least this much.
Yet no real legislature has the time or inclination for this study. In the
real world, the legislators' conflicts and biases will continue to exist. It
is thus unclear why legislatures should "bear sole authority" to dictate
fundamental value judgments that would displace the problematic
reasonable person standard.
Indeed, a jury may actually be in a better position than a legisla
ture to accept the legitimacy of a stalking victim's fear. Since stalking
often involves a pattern of actions innocent on their own, legislators
considering the matter abstractly may indeed be suspicious of "hys
terical, hypersensitive women." Jurors, hearing the real-life stalking
story of an actual victim, may be able to understand the fear she de
scribes because they have experienced this fear vicariously through
stalking stories. Because of the emotional manipulation of horror
films, jurors who have never experienced stalking might be able to
understand the fear that a repeated pattern of unwanted activity can
cause.
While stalking narratives do skew the perspective of jurors to some
extent, priming them to expect that stalkers and their victims will fit
into narrowly defined gender and social roles, many of these social
biases are endemic to all determinations of the jury. The archetypical
stalking story and the stalking story told by the victim may not per
fectly match, but at least the vast variety of stalking stories that per
vade our culture has taught us that not everything fits neatly into a
simple pattern.42 While stalking stories are far from a perfect aid to
judging this crime, at least these narratives give us a glimpse of the ter
ror of being stalked and put us in a position to take seriously the vic
tim's claim. Stalking stories can at least teach us that much.

42. The diversity of stalking stories is immediately apparent, far more so than the
underlying patriarchal themes that form the focus of Kamir's attention. The genre, after all,
encompasses ancient Hebrew myths, Dracula, and the "watchful eye" of our legal system.
"Diverse" is perhaps an understatement.

